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30 March 2007
The Pentagon released a report March 14 declaring that the conflict in Iraq is more complex than a civil war; it identifies the diverse and interconnected relationships between extremists, ethnic and sectarian groups, and how they each play key roles in the ongoing conflict.
While the complexity of Iraq is not a new phenomenon, its recognition by the military is. With this recognition, an appropriate strategy must be implemented in Iraq if the United States is to have any meaningful measure of success.
Currently, the military is employing a strategy of counterinsurgency, led by the general who developed the doctrine. Unfortunately, a counterinsurgency strategy only addresses one part of the complex environment that is Iraq, a path that will continue to lead to failure.
The U.S. Army's new counterinsurgency manual defines insurgency as an armed and organized movement aimed at overthrowing a government; however, what we see in Iraq is so much more. For many Americans, the term insurgency is a broad concept, used to describe the cumulative ills that afflict Iraq. Using the term insurgency, however, limits our ability to understand what is happening in Iraq; it compels us to see a simple armed rebellion, masking the true complexity of the situation.
This poor understanding of the environment has raised false hope in the ability of counterinsurgency operations to succeed.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, an insurgency began. Loyalist forces and transnational fighters attempted to undermine the U.S. occupation and the transitional government with their military attacks. Because of their success, what was "just" an insurgency became an embryonic civil war and ultimately a complete regression of civil society.
Political support moved from the centralized government to other sources of power, representing not only the initial insurgents but also militias and warlords split along sectarian, ethnic and clan lines.
An insurgency must be stopped in its infancy before it is allowed to harden and embed itself into the political and cultural structure of a nation. If a source of power other than the government becomes the legitimate power within the state, such as warlords or sectarian groups, then those other groups become the de facto governments. This is precisely what happened in Iraq: The Iraqi government and the U.S. occupation forces have become subordinate to the decentralized centers of power that exist along ethnic and sectarian lines.
As these groups become more powerful, they have begun to fight among themselves. The sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq is not just a continuation of the insurgency but a political negotiation by means of armed conflict that can only be described as civil war. With each assault, the divisions and cleavages within Iraq become more entrenched. Breaking down the barriers that impede trust and cooperation has become a nearly impossible task, and is certainly not possible within the next year.
To combat the deteriorating situation, the U.S. Army has attempted to implement a counterinsurgency campaign. A significant component of these operations is the development of complex interdependence at the individual and community level. This interdependence intends to cut across ethnic and sectarian lines, building trust and reciprocity between groups through cooperative arrangements.
The ultimate goal of counterinsurgency is to develop these complex networks of trust to weaken the other sources of power before they become established. Gen. David Petraeus recognizes that building trust is a necessity for success in Iraq by suggesting the Iraqi government reconcile with militant groups. Unfortunately, the insurgency, and the groups that have developed from it, have become institutionalized and provide a significant obstacle to a successful conclusion in Iraq.
Petraeus must develop a plan to converge interests across diverse groups while rebuilding the trust in the United States and the Iraqi government that has been lost, possibly irretrievably, over the last four years. Yet he lacks the necessary economic and political experts to help negotiate and invigorate Iraqi civil society through investment and serious attempts to develop political interaction between the individual factions.
The United States needs to review its expectations for success in Iraq despite the short-term "encouraging signs" the president sees. Had counterinsurgency operations been undertaken three years ago, or even two, the prognosis for Iraq could be significantly better. Instead, we have allowed the insurgency to evolve into a much more complex conflict that has features of a civil war, intracommunal warfare and tribal warlord-ism.
Petraeus is fighting a one-dimensional counterinsurgency fight while facing a multifaceted conflict. We have ill-equipped our commander in Iraq to accomplish the task he has been assigned by providing him only with more troops, limited funds and an inflexible, antagonistic political system within Iraq. The most important tool for winning in Iraq is momentum, a resource that we have already squandered. While we pray for success in Iraq, we have placed our faith in counterinsurgency -- a tactic that is at least two years too late.
This commentary first appeared in Defense News on March 26, 2007. Richard May served as an officer in the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan and Iraq. He is the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the World Security Institute's Center for Defense Information.