CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

U.S. Post-Sept. 11 Arms Trade Policy

9 February 2007

In the five years since the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has solidified a trend of supplying high technology weapons and millions of dollars in military assistance to allies in the "war on terror."  Support for the United States -- either in its quest to stamp out international terrorist networks, or for its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- seems to take precedence over other criteria usually taken into account when the United States considers an arms transfer. 

Reports by Country

Updated: Jan. 3, 2007: >  Armenia >  Azerbaijan  >  Georgia Updated: Jan. 8, 2007: >  India  >  Nepal >  Pakistan Updated: Jan. 15, 2007: >  Indonesia >  Philippines >  Thailand Updated: Jan. 22, 2007: >  Bahrain  >  Oman  >  Yemen Updated: Jan. 29, 2007: >  Kazakhstan  >  Kyrgyzstan >  Tajikistan  >  Turkmenistan >  Uzbekistan Updated: Feb. 5, 2007: >  Algeria  >  Chad  >  Mali >  Mauritania >  Niger   Updated: Feb. 12, 2007: >  Djibouti  >  Ethiopia >  Kenya Updated: Definitions >  Definitions

According to standing tenets of U.S. arms export policy, arms transfers should not undermine long-term security and stability, weaken democratic movements, support military coups, escalate arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms build-ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit human rights abuses.  However, in the last five years, the Bush administration has demonstrated a willingness to provide weapons and military training to weak and failing states and countries that have been repeatedly criticized by the U.S. State Department for human rights violations, lack of democracy, and even support of terrorism.

To thoroughly evaluate and analyze this trend of increased military assistance, the Challenging Conventional Threats project at CDI has, since 2001, profiled countries that have a unique role in the "war on terror," through the strategic services they have provided to the United States as it conducts anti-terror operations across the globe.  The series features analysis of the current political situations in the profiled countries, taking into account other indicators of the relative stability and openness of the country, such as military expenditures, total number of armed forces, and the human rights situation as assessed by the U.S. State Department, alongside an evaluation of U.S. military assistance to these countries over the past 17 years -- the post-Cold War years.

Our research shows some troubling trends.  More than half of the countries examined in our series have already received more total military assistance in the four years after Sept. 11, than in the 12 previous years combined.  On average, countries have received 50 percent more U.S. weaponry and military training in post-Sept. 11 years than in pre-Sept. 11 years.  This trend has been dominated by marked increases in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) specifically.  The amount of FMF given to, and total value of DCS concluded with, the profiled countries since Sept. 11 are both 50 percent greater than the amount received by the same countries between fiscal year (FY) 1990 and 2001.  On average, countries are receiving 80 percent more FMF and DCS since FY 02 than prior to FY 02.  The increase in FMF and DCS demonstrate that both the U.S. government and U.S. defense industry are reaping the rewards of the increased sales.

At the same time that U.S. military assistance is increasing, the poor human rights situations in many countries have not improved since the start of the "war on terror" (and in some cases have become worse).  Moreover, in 2005, the State Department reported that "serious abuses" were committed by the government or state security forces in more than half of the countries examined in this series,.  For instance, the State Department has described the human rights situation in Uzbekistan as "very poor" every year for the past 17 years, yet Uzbekistan has seen a nearly 10-fold increase in the amount of U.S. military assistance it has received since 2001.  Countries such as Nepal and Yemen, which had not been major recipients of U.S. weapons in the 10 years prior to Sept. 11 due to human rights concerns, are also emerging as substantial arms trading partners while showing little if any improvement in their human rights records. In addition, several countries in the series have had serious political changes, including military coups, and are in some cases quite unstable. In 2006, for example, Nepal experienced a general strike and nation-wide political demonstrations during which police and soldiers fired on civilian protestors; Thailand's government was overthrown by a military coup; and an attempted coup was carried out against the Chadian government, which has also been involved in armed border skirmishes with Sudanese soldiers, militia groups, and rebels.

Increased military assistance to allies in the "war on terror" shows no sign of abating.  The total assistance received by the 25 countries in FY 05 was greater than in any other single year examined in this study, and more than double FY 04 totals.  Budget requests and projected weapons sales for FY 06 are not as high as FY 05 levels, but are still significantly higher than any other years in the study, and FY 07 projections currently stand 25 percent higher than FY 05 appropriations and sales. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense has just announced that FY 05 Foreign Military Sales added up to over $20 billion -- more than twice the FY 04 total of $10.6 billion.

In addition to traditional avenues of military assistance, since Sept. 11, the United States has created new programs with specific counterterrorism agendas, which provide additional outlets for the granting of U.S. military training and assistance to countries the United States has identified as key to the "war on terror."  In FY 02, the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was created with a mandate to provide non-lethal anti-terrorism training, but began offering lethal training in FY 04 and now essentially serves the same purpose as the State Department's International Military Education and training (IMET) program. In FY 06, Congress authorized the Defense Department to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations.  Creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the Defense budget provides a way around Foreign Assistance Act restrictions on training or arming human rights abusers that apply to all State Department funding.  Many of the countries profiled in CDIs series have received either or both CTFP and Section 1206 funding (which allows the Secretary of Defense to bypass the restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act and provide equipment, training, and supplies directly to foreign militaries) in addition to the thousands or millions of dollars already provided through the five major military assistance programs.

The implications of increased military assistance to all countries profiled in this series are significant. Even when the increase in military assistance provided by the United States appears small, especially when compared to major U.S. trading partners, such as the United Kingdom or other NATO allies, for many countries, any increase in military assistance is noteworthy, regardless of the actual dollar amount provided. Many of the countries in this series had received little if any funding prior to Sept. 11 due to human rights concerns and lack of economic openness and democratic reform.  For instance, since Sept. 11, Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) have all been removed from U.S. sanctions lists and become eligible for U.S. military assistance, despite reports by the U.S. State Department that security forces in nearly all of these countries have committed human rights abuses, despite India's and Pakistan's ongoing nuclear programs and continued tension, despite Indonesia's lack of political and democratic reform and continued human rights concerns, and despite these countries' involvement in a variety of current inter- and intra-state conflicts.

The data clearly show that the United States is sending unprecedented levels of military assistance to countries that it simultaneously criticizes for lack of respect for human rights and, in some cases, for questionable democratic processes.  As a foreign policy, this is confusing, short-sighted and potentially very dangerous.  Once weapons are delivered to a country, it becomes increasingly difficult to control how they are used, and prevent them from being illicitly diverted anywhere in the world.  While these countries are currently considered important to U.S. efforts in the "war on terror" now, political and military instability makes their continued allegiance to the United States questionable.  Arming such countries to the hilt with top-of-the-line U.S. weaponry could allow them to target the United States, or its allies or to allow the weapons to fall in the hands of enemies of the United States.  Selling arms for short-term political gains undermines long-term U.S national security and strategic interests.

By Rachel Stohl and Rhea Myerscough

Comments