WORLD SECURITY INSTITUTE

Triaging NATO: Mr. Bush Goes to Bucharest

3 April 2008

Even during his last NATO summit as U.S. president, George W. Bush has managed to annoy allies and non-allies alike. In this new commentary, Mark Burgess, director of the WSI Brussels office, takes a look at the implications of Bush's (ultimately unsuccessful) call to invite Georgia and Ukraine to work toward eventual membership, as well as the more pressing problems facing the Atlantic Alliance.

 

Triaging NATO: Mr. Bush (The Younger) Goes to Bucharest

By Mark Burgess, Director of the WSI Brussels office

 

American diplomacy under the administration of George W. Bush has been far from diplomatic at times. As such, it is no surprise that he should commence his last NATO summit as U.S. president by annoying allies and non-allies alike - most particularly (but not exclusively) France, Germany and Russia. On this occasion, the discord arose out of Bush's strongly and publicly worded (if ultimately unsuccessful) call for the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Ukraine to be invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that paves the path to eventual membership of the Atlantic Alliance.

Often, it is the manner rather than the matter of Bushs way of doing business that causes offense. However in this case he affronted on both counts. According to recent news reports, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was under the impression - gained during talks with the American president in recent weeks - that he was happy to support a compromise solution whereby Georgia and Ukraine would be encouraged to work towards MAP participation, possibly in time for NATO's 60th anniversary summit in Berlin next year, but stopping short of inviting such a move now. If this is the case, German anger at Bush's handling of the issue is understandable. America's stance also directly contradicted the recently-stated official French position, while Russia, as might be expected, has long been vehemently opposed to any further eastward expansion of NATO.

There is also real substance to counter-arguments to Bushs call to admit Georgia and Ukraine into the MAP. Not only can it be contended that neither country is ready for such a move yet - as is widely acknowledged, the notion of joining NATO is unpopular among the Ukrainian public, while Georgia's repression of opposition movements and ongoing territorial disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia give legitimate cause for concern - but there is also the question of Russia's opposition to consider. This is not to say that Russia should be given any sort of veto over NATO; however, it would be folly to not consider the likely deterioration in East-West relations should Georgia and Ukraine be given too green a light for NATO membership. In this regard, discretion is the better part of common sense. There is little wisdom in provoking Russia unduly; not least at a time when some hope remains for some sort of improved relations under Vladimir Putin's successor.

That said, it was necessary to draw a line in the sand of sorts and send a message that Moscow cannot dictate terms to NATO and that the Alliance's door remains open to Georgia and Ukraine, even if now is not the ideal time for them to begin to enter. Initial reports from the Bucharest summit indicate that attempts are being made to downplay any appearance that the decision not to extend MAP status to the two countries just yet is a victory for Russia and humiliation for NATO. How successful these attempts will prove ultimately depends on what newspapers you read and who has the best spin doctors. Arguably clearer is the fact that Bushs stance has potentially left NATO with egg on its face and created a problem where one did not really need to exist.

Quite why he did this is open to debate, although his behaviour this week does very much fit the much-professed missionary rhetoric for democracy (albeit the right sort of democracy) to which he is prone. Moreover, on one reading, the situation, if not quite a win-win for Bush, could be seen as something close to it. For, while it always appeared unlikely that he would succeed in his stated goal of having Georgia and Ukraine invited to participate in the MAP, any positive outcome here could be claimed as a much-needed legacy for a presidency that is widely-hailed as being somewhat less than successful.

In addition, sometimes asking for more than you think you can get is helpful in getting what you want. Bush seemed as convinced as always by the righteousness of his cause in arguing for a MAP invitation for Georgia and Ukraine. However this could possibly be viewed as a concession-in-waiting (and a face-saving measure for a Russia he hopes to gain cooperation from on other matters like missile defence) rather than a demand he expected to have any real chance of being met.

Regardless, NATO has more pressing matters to deal with at Bucharest than extending MAP status to Georgia and Ukraine. This can and should wait until another occasion. The challenge now is to mitigate any damage the public disagreement over this issue may cause and to move on to other more pressing matters.

Chief among these is Afghanistan, where NATO has come to be viewed as the architect of the currently dire security situation, something the very fate of the Alliance is being increasingly linked to. That the most ardent proponent of this linkage is the same U.S. administration that overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in relatively short order only to ignore the post-conflict phase and leave NATO to pick up the pieces reeks of an irony and hypocrisy that has become all too prevalent in the Bush administration's international dealings. This is especially pertinent when it is considered that this same administration turned down NATO's offer of assistance (in the form of its historic invocation of its Article V collective security mechanism) in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

To paraphrase a recent observation by Timothy Garton Ash, America has gone from not needing a French Frigate (to recall then-U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's reaction on hearing of NATO's offer of help) to needing a thousand French troops to shore up Canada's understandably and justifiably beleaguered military contribution in Afghanistan.

In short, while Georgia and Ukraine can wait, Afghanistan cannot. It was to be hoped, if perhaps not expected, that George W. Bush of all NATO leaders should have realised that and not further added to the Alliance's worries when it can ill afford this.

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