WORLD SECURITY INSTITUTE

NATO's Global Dilemma

8 September 2008

The recent crisis in Georgia is only the latest problem to tax NATO. As well as problems with its old enemy, Russia, the alliance's woes in its biggest mission to date continue, causing some to question whether or not it is relevant or needed in today's world. Afghanistan, NATO's first ground shooting war is, by extension, its most pressing problem. Almost seven years after the U.S. invasion, Afghanistan still totters on the brink of failed statehood, while NATO's first war might yet prove its last.

Rumors of NATO's impending death may be overstated, however failure in Afghanistan will be costly to it as an organisation that has sought to reinvent itself since the passing of the Cold War and its original raison d'être. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has become a major element of that reinvention. Yet its problems in Afghanistan give cause for concern as to how effective NATO can hope to be as a fighting force.

NATO's woes in Afghanistan stem partly from the inherent difficulties of counterinsurgency operations. However ISAF is also hindered by the lack of a common strategy among its various national components, as well as various degrees of commitment to the mission and sensitivity to domestic politics when it comes to using their troops.

Caveats' limitations on where, how, or when troops can be deployed have been contentious for some time with some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, feeling they are bearing the brunt of things, with others, including France, Germany and Italy, less inclined to put their forces in harm's way or increase contingents. Such reticence is understandable when NATO signed on to its expanded mission in Afghanistan many members believed they would be assisting development rather than providing security. Now some troops are facing combat and casualty levels unsurpassed since World War II.

War a la carte, such as some NATO countries seem to be fighting in Afghanistan risks seriously, perhaps even fatally, undermining the principle of collective security and defence that lies at NATO's core. Moves to limit caveats began in recent months and should continue until none remain. They undermine NATO and its mission in Afghanistan.

Additionally, it is worth noting that ISAF is seeking to fix a problem it inherited. The original American invasion quickly overthrew Afghanistan's Taliban government but ignored the immediate post-conflict phase to a degree that allowed the security situation to deteriorate. This foreshadowed the Bush administration's subsequent mishandling of events in Iraq. It was also made all the more ironic by Washington's dismissal of NATO's historic invocation of its Article 5 collective security mechanism immediately following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, a rebuttal which was itself damaging to NATO.

Pakistan too must share some blame for the situation in neighboring Afghanistan, with suspicions abounding that elements of the former's intelligence services provide succor and support to the very insurgents they are supposed to be fighting. Meanwhile, Western governments must educate their publics as to the need to be in Afghanistan at all, something the debate over caveats indicates is not happening to the level required.

This may prove difficult at the moment given NATO's other big problem, the crisis in Georgia. Russia's invasion of Georgia and subsequent posturing and recognition of the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have left NATO open to charges of impotence. Yet, it is unclear what the alliance, a military organization, can do in this situation. Once again, the contrast with the Cold War is stark.

Some U.S. presidential hopefuls Barack Obama and John McCain among them have suggested that efforts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO be expedited. Both countries were denied NATO Membership Actions Plans (MAPs) at the alliance's summit in Bucharest in April this year. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia, suspicions abound that the decision not to issue MAPs gave a green light to Moscow, convincing it the West was weak and disunited when it came to this issue. Indeed, it has been suggested that this may also have encouraged Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to take on Russia, convincing him that Europe was and would remain weak when it came to standing up to his giant neighbor on the question of Georgian membership of NATO, a prospect that escalating Russian violations of Georgian territorial integrity made increasingly unlikely.

Yet, it can also be argued that U.S. President George W. Bush's public call at the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit for MAPs to be offered to Georgia and Ukraine was ill-advised, ill-executed and ill-timed. For one thing, Bush alienated some NATO allies, notably Germany. He had earlier given them the impression that he would support a compromise solution that stopped short of immediate MAP offers for the two former Soviet states, instead encouraging preparatory work for such a move, possibly in time for NATO's 60th anniversary summit in Berlin in 2009. Bush's altar call in Bucharest also directly contradicted the recently-stated official French position. This did indeed telegraph a picture of Western disunity on the subject to Russia. However, this occurred for no immediately discernible good reason, NATO consensus on what Bush called for was always seen as unlikely, at a time when the opposite appearance was needed and when NATO, as now, had more pressing concerns in Afghanistan. Moreover there were, and remain, questions as to Georgia and Ukraine's eligibility for NATO. Membership of the alliance is unpopular among a large element of the Ukrainian public, while Georgian repression of opposition movements, coupled with the instability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have long been cited as potential show-stoppers.

Arguments that Russia is stoking unrest in these regions as a means of keeping Georgia out of NATO are not without merit. Yet the fact remains that Tbilisi's behavior, not least most recently, has often inflamed rather than ameliorated things. As such, the decision not to offer MAPs at Bucharest was a defendable one, even if the manner in which it was handled may well have increased Russia's perception of Western weakness, with the current crisis in Georgia partly a result of that.

Now more than ever, there is a need for NATO to put up a front of solidarity and draw the line in the sand it should have drawn in Bucharest, sending the strong message it also should have sent then that Moscow cannot dictate terms to NATO and that the alliance's door will indeed remain open to Georgia and Ukraine. NATO should proceed at a prompt but measured pace on this, especially if it means bringing forward any MAP offers: the Georgian president has already clearly demonstrated the dangers in overreacting to Russian provocations. However, in so doing NATO should better consider and address Russia's concerns with regard to the alliance's post-Cold War expansion, for it is these that arguably underlie the Kremlin's current actions in Georgia.

This expansion was cautioned against by the likes of George Kennan, Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, and has been claimed to play on Russian paranoia and humiliation at being the undefeated loser of the Cold War to a degree that is only now becoming apparent. Whatever may be thought of recent Russian actions, their claims of NATO encroachment are not unfounded. Ostensibly, NATO expansion is designed to spread stability and security, however, there are suspicions in some quarters that it is used for power projection by its most powerful member, the United States. More plausibly, it is also claimed that it is being used to contain Russia. Energy security has also been posited as a useful side effect of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO.

None of this is to suggest that Russia is somehow blameless or should not be held accountable for its aggression in Georgia. Nor, it is worth restating, should it be given some sort of veto over NATO enlargement. However, the consequences of such enlargement may be different now than they once were. Heightened Russian assertiveness contrasts with the divisions within NATO. Russia is not a world superpower anymore. But it is still a regional one that, absent any balancing that came with the Cold War threat of mutually assured destruction, may well feel increasingly tempted and able to call the West's bluff. As such, NATO should be prepared to follow through on any commitments made to new or potential members.

That it is in some ways questionable if NATO would have engaged in a full-scale war with Russia over Georgia, even if the latter had been an alliance member, is something Moscow is doubtlessly well aware of. Poland, which is an alliance member, certainly seems to put little trust in Article 5 of NATO's Charter, as the recent deal to station U.S. missile defense components within its borders illustrates. Warsaw's main motivation appeared to be obtaining the security guarantees that come with having American troops on Polish soil, an entangling alliance being considered to provide sounder security guarantees than NATO, or at the very least pursued as an insurance policy.

Recent events in Georgia require urgent action from NATO. However, the shadow of Afghanistan and NATO's fight there still looms large. It is the more pressing emergency and should be treated as such. That said, NATO clearly also needs an internal debate to come up with consensus as to what enlargement is for security sector reform, containing Russia, or both, as well as criteria for candidature and benchmarks for eventual membership.

The development of an energy security policy that leaves it less dependent on Russian gas and oil supplies, and therefore less constrained as to what actions it can take in the face of Russian belligerence such as has been witnessed in Georgia, will also leave NATO better equipped to navigate a geostrategic environment that is much more uncertain than that of the Cold War. Wider attempts to finally take nuclear weapons out of international relations are also needed more than ever with East-West confrontation once again rearing its head.

Yet, as the Georgia crisis continues it is also worth considering that Russia is far from the global superpower it once was. With a defense budget a little over one-tenth of America's and an economy one-fourteenth the size, Russia lacks the resources to bedevil the West on the scale that the old Soviet Union could, even if it would be folly to forget that the nuclear genie cannot easily be put back into the bottle. None of this is to suggest that Russia is a sheep in wolf's clothing; however its scope for mischief may be more limited than current fears suggest. That should give the West some degree of relief, and give NATO some breathing space, as it seeks to cope with its "new" old enemy and the more immediate problem of fixing Afghanistan.

Mark Burgess

Director, WSI Brussels

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